Abstract: This paper aims to verify the claims that the new international forums created by countries from the Global South, the BRICS and the IBSA, are anti-Western. Firstly, it reviews the Eurocentric historical literature aiming to determine what it classifies as "Western", and uses this to evaluate Global South countries and forums. As these preliminary findings are insufficient to conclude anything, it investigates these countries actions within existing organizations -where different national agendas weaken coordination -and the establishment of new forums -which brings more optimistic perspectives. The conclusion is that although these groups might not be labeled "anti-Western", their coordinate institutionalized action has the potentiality to bring about new structures to the international system with a non-Western paradigm. Keywords: East-West divide; Global South; New International Forums.
Introduction
The present paper aims to discuss whether the new international forums composed by countries from the "Global South" are anti-Western. In order to try to answer this question, it shall take into consideration two of the most famous and recently created groupings, i.e., the BRICS -which now brings together Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -and IBSA -composed by the same members, but Russia and China. This analytical choice has been made because these are possibly two of the most famous and discussed new international groupings which bring together only developing countries from the South. Meanwhile, both also have some particularities, whose closer examination can provide us good insights about their nature and purposes in relation to the current international order.
It begins with an overview of the emergence of new countries into the spotlight of the international arena, trying to highlight the historical moment when this phenomenon has taken place and its main characteristics. Next, it proceeds to a historical analysis of what has been called "the rise of the West". In this second part, the objective is to present what specifically characterizes the West, and therefore what does it mean to be Western. To do so, we present a brief review of the historical literature which covers the moment of the rise of Europe written by some historians considered to be Eurocentric, trying to capture which characteristics they see as particular from this moment. These observations shall be used as benchmarks for the comparison with the countries which are currently being appointed as the recent risers. Finally, it proceeds to an institutional analysis about what have been the main innovations developed by these new groupings.
The Phenomenon of the Emergence of the Global South
The beginning of the 21 st century presented many challenges to the established powers, especially the United States and Europe. Early in the century, in 2001, the United States have suffered the September 11 terrorist attacks in its own soil. The
American reaction was to begin wars first in Afghanistan and later in Iraq which, by their turn, brought additional difficulties for the country, including an extremely high cost of several billion dollars, of American lives which have been lost in combat and of growing public dissatisfaction, both at home and abroad. Also, in the last years of the first decade of the century, the United States, and soon after its European partners, have found themselves among the most severe financial crisis since the Wall Street crash in
1929.
It is precisely in this turbulent scenario to the rich, industrialized nations of the North that the phenomenon of the rise of emergent countries takes place. While traditional centers of power and influence were facing tremendous difficulties, new countries of the so called "Global South" have attracted international attention.
According to Benachenhou (2013, p. 199) , the typical profile of an emerging country:
Is the one of a country which has achieved the diversification of its economy, developing mainly products which have greatest demand in the world market; which frequently enjoys an efficient financial intermediation with an efficient banking industry and a dynamic capital market; which has a strong agricultural basis […] ; which has an opening policy -often selective, but evolutionary -which allows it to place itself in a regional and/or global labor division and which boosts growth with its technologies, its markets and its capitals, assuring a notable foreign investment flow and growing international destinations to its exports. 1 Although Benachenhou's description is not sufficient, it focuses on the crucial issue of the emergence of these countries, the economic power. Take as an example the four initial countries of the then-called BRIC -Brazil, Russia, India and China. Even though each one has its own national peculiarities, all of them have achieved great economic success in the first decade of the 21 st century due to their integration within global economy. While China has established itself as a fundamental production center of manufactured goods to international trade, India has managed to insert itself in the services sector, especially in what relates to information technology. Both Brazil and Russia have benefitted from the high prices of their exporting commodities in the international market (ZAKARIA, 2012; BREMMER, 2012; KUPCHAN, 2012) Nevertheless, although the economy is a crucial element in the rise of the emerging countries, it does not explain this phenomenon in its entirety. According to Zakaria (2012, p. 04) , "the rise of the rest is at heart an economic phenomenon, but it has consequences for nearly every other sphere of life". In part as a consequence of their economic success, emerging countries achieved greater self confidence, which has been translated into an assertive, creative and pragmatic diplomatic posture (BISLEY, 2013, p. 14) . Many situations exemplify this transformation, as in the year of 2008, when Brazil and India aligned themselves to block Doha Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Russia invaded Georgia simultaneously to the opening of the Olympic Games in Beijing (BISLEY, 2013, p. 14) .
Observing this combination of increasing economic power with proactive political-diplomatic action, some analysts declared that we are witnessing "the crisis of global power", which is a "consequence of the dynamic center of gravity from the West to the East" combined with poor performance of the United States, at home and abroad, and a global "political awakening" (BRZEZINSKI, 2012, p. 05 ).
This process might be perceived in two different, although interrelated, domains.
The first one is the contestatory role played by emergent countries within already existent international organizations. More confident, these countries claim those institutions were designed according to an old world order, from the post-World War II, which is not representative of the current international distribution of power. In this sense, for example, emerging countries have criticized the weighted votes at the IMF, claiming greater responsibility for themselves. The strongest critique to the existing international institutions, however, refers to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) structure, in which only five countries hold veto power. Paul Kennedy (2010, p. 247) highlights the challenge imposed to the Council by the rise of emerging countries:
The power-political implications of the rise of, say, India and Brazil to greater economic and strategic influence inevitably challenge the stranglehold that the five permanent veto-owning members have had in the Security Council over the past sixty years. It was an axiom of the UN's founding fathers that Great Powers had somehow to receive special (if negative) rights in order to prevent them from leaving or blocking the international system, as happened in the 1920s and 1930s. It would be hard to deny that argument to India if its GDP sails past that of Britain and France over the next decade or so.
The second domain is the establishment of new international forums composed by countries from the Global South. About this process, Andrew Hurrell (2010, p. 62) observes that recently "there has been an increasing emphasis on different sorts of informal groupings, clubs, concerts and coalitions" which are forming "a complex mosaic of various groupings that are emerging in a process of 'global à la cartism' or 'messy multilateralism' […] in response to shifts in global power".
In 2001, for instance, investment bank Goldman Sachs published a study authored by its Head of Global Economic Research, Jim O'Neill, which has since had a significant impact on world politics. O'Neill presented scenarios of economic evolution according to which the BRICs -Brazil, Russia, India and, especially, China -would soon overcome the traditional G-7 economies (O'NEILL, 2001) . Although the main purpose of this report was to orient global investors about promising markets for them, the countries analyzed have been inspired and started to establish some diplomatic links.
The first steps have been meetings among representatives of these four countries alongside the annual opening session of the United Nations General Assembly, until they decided to institutionalize the group. Together with institutionalization was created an Annual Summit, with the presence of the chiefs of state themselves, and many sectorial coordination mechanisms addressing the most different agendas. The latter accession of South Africa into the grouping -which changed its acronym to BRICS -shows how the original investment strategy has become a comprehensive and institutionalized mechanism of political diplomatic coordination.
Although the BRICS is the most publicly discussed new international forum, emerging countries have also established others in recent years. In 2003, for example, Brazil, India and South Africa created the IBSA-Dialogue Forum, which itself claims to be the gathering of three multiethnic emerging democracies with the purpose of establishing global coordination aiming the reform of the international institutions architecture (IBSA, 2006) . This was the culmination of a process of mutual cooperation and engagement which included the three countries fight against pharmaceutical industries in relation to the HIV/AIDS medicaments -in 1997 Brazil approved a patent law allowing its government to break the commercial monopoly of the drugs patent while South Africa passed an Act permitting itself to import these medicaments from India at a lower cost -and opposition to the Iraq war (PRASHAD, 2012, p. 180-185) .
Taken together, all these facts represent an important challenge to today's international order. Emerging powers seem to be taking on the global stage, but exactly how it will happen -and whether it will at all -is still extremely uncertain.
Nevertheless, this very possibility that new actors, different from the current Western ones, may join and shape international order bring up fears that this order will be antiWestern. According to Patrick (2010, p. 44 First of all, however, it seems important to perceive when the phenomenon of the rise of the West has occurred, according to these historians. For Eric Jones, this process can be traced back to between A.D. 1400-1800, "when Europe underwent those political, technological and geographical upheavals which were to make it the birthplace of the industrial world" (JONES, 1987, p. 225) .
Another important author, Michael Mann, traces two different phases, according to his theoretical formulations, to conclude that it was a process which lasted from 1000 to 1800. For him, there was a first moment, when Europe was characterized by intensive power, that is, "the ability to organize tightly and command a high level of mobilization from the participants, whether the area and numbers covered are great or small" (MANN, 1986, p. 07 ). This division is important, for it allows Mann to counter argue those who claim that in this period Europe was inferior to Asia. To him, however, this is only true if we consider extensive power, i.e., "the ability to organize large numbers of people over far-flung territories in order to engage in minimally stable cooperation" (MANN, 1986, p. 07) . Considering intensive power, he further claims, Europe was already ahead of Asia, for it incorporated some inventions -notably the water wheel, the diffusion of the heavy plow, of the three-field system and of horseshoes -which led it to dispose of a "whole new agricultural system" through decentralized regional control (MANN, 1988, p. 07-09) . Mann even defends it is difficult to precisely date these innovations but, even though their use has intensified after A.D. 1000, its development dates back to earlier moments (MANN, 1988, p. 07-09) . Finally, for him the year of 1450 marks a decisive turn, in which Europe surpasses Asia by using extensive power techniques -by then, especially through the scientific revolution and the naval expansion -, in a process which would reach its apex in the 19 th century with the Industrial Revolution (MANN, 1988, p. 07-09) .
Thirdly, David Landes has a similar narrative: he describes how Europe was in a terrible situation around the year 1000, stressing it was invaded and ransacked by many different peoples, but "once the Europeans found themselves reasonably secure from outside aggression (eleventh century on), they were able, as never before and as nowhere else, to pursue their own advantage" (LANDES, 1999, p. 40) . This has led to the "long multicentennial maturation (1000-1500)" which rested on an "economic revolution", and a "long period of population increase and economic growth", only once briefly interrupted by the plague (LANDES, 1999, p. 40) .
From these three authors, we may see that there is a certain convergence that the rise of the West was a long process, which lasted roughly from the late Middle Ages to the Industrial Revolution. In these centuries, some aspects have been pointed as fundamental ones, and certainly one of them is democracy, related with the political situation of Europe during the last centuries of the Middle Ages.
For Mann (1986, p. 376) , for example, around A.D. 1000, Europe was a "multiple acephalous federation", i.e., it was not governed by an individual person or institution.
Actually, no center or single political agenda had full control of the continent. Instead, it was composed of small and interlinked interaction networks, which had their autonomy guaranteed by law or habit, which allowed a situation of equilibrium. At that moment of the end of feudalism, small and politically weak states, which had growing, but far from hegemonic, domestic powers, composed a "diplomatically regulated multistate civilization" (MANN, 1986, p. 507 ).
David Landes presents a similar rationale. For him, "in those middle years between ancient and modern, fragmentation was the strongest brake on willful, oppressive behavior. Political rivalry and the right of exit made all the difference" for Europe (LANDES, 1999, p. 38) . He goes even further, claiming this Western feature dates back to the battles between the Greeks -representing the West, free cities/polis and popular sovereignty -and the Persians -representing the East, aristocratic empires and oriental despotism, and concluding that "Europe had always thought of itself as different from the societies to the East" (LANDES, 1999, p. 30 This term has a long history within Western thinking, whose notion is present in seminal works by Aristotle, Montesquieu and Hegel, just to name a few (MINUTI, 2012) . Roughly, it states that the environmental conditions of Eastern societies led to the development of hydraulic systems of irrigations, which demanded great state coordination. This necessity has led to a concentration of power on the hands of a single ruler, which acted in despotic ways. Max Weber, in 1898, wrote that:
The crucial factor which made Near Eastern development so different was the need for irrigation systems, as a result of which the cities were closely connected with building canals and constant regulation of waters and rivers, all of which demanded the existence of a unified bureaucracy (WEBER, 1976, p. 157 ).
The notion of oriental despotism has since been a fundamental reference for those who tried to study the rise of the West. While in the East whole societies were dominated by despotic rulers, free cities was the order of the day in the Occident, in a situation reinforced by the political fragmentation in which the power was split among multiple spheres, individuals and institutions. This has empowered citizens in face of the state, and later allowed democracy to flourish. But the notion of oriental despotism is not only used to justify European democracy in contrast to Oriental authoritarian regimes, but it is also part of the explanation of the development of capitalism in
Europe. According to Landes (1999, p. 31) , for example, Linked to the opposition between Greek democracy and oriental despotism was that between private property and ruler-owns all.
[…] In these circumstances, the very notion of economic development was a Western invention. Aristocratic (despotic) empires were characteristically squeeze operations: when the elites wanted more, they did not think in gains of productivity.
Also, Michael Mann labels Europe in the 12 th century a "competitive civilization", in which fragmentation of power allowed for trade to flourish (MANN, 1986, p. 504) . He also highlights the importance of private property, since to perform in a competitive environment, autonomous actors must have the freedom to act without a third party's constraint. Indeed, he presents the etymology of the word "private" as "hidden" or, specifically in this case, "hidden from the power of the state" (MANN, 1988, p. 11) .
Private property rights of autonomous actors led to the growth of commerce and the economy, and created conditions to the rise of the bourgeoisie and capitalism, the latter an element frequently pointed out as characteristic of the rise of the West.
However, another element was involved in the development of capitalism: inventions.
As we have seen earlier, for example, Mann cites many inventions in order to explain the development of a new and revolutionary agricultural system, which had an important economic impact. For his part, Eric Jones defends that "European society always contained a number of individuals whose creative talents were directed to improving the means of production.
[…] It was their hobby or obsession. This was a deep seated cultural phenomenon" (JONES, 1987, p. 228) . It is thus presented as an inate characteristic of Europeans to be creative, something which distinguished them from other peoples. But Jones also offers a comparison with Eastern societies, arguing that "despite great creative surges in times when Europe had still been primitive, despotic Asian institutions suppressed creativity or diverted it into producing voluptuous luxuries" (JONES, 1987, p. 231 ).
In the same way, the "invention of invention" marked positively the European development, according to David Landes. Europeans, who differentiated themselves from other peoples for their "joie de trouver", have routinized discoveries (LANDES, 1999, p. 58, 204) . This has given them a technological superiority, which culminated with the Industrial Revolution.
According to this interpretation, Westerners were constantly trying to come up with new ideas and produce new inventions, what has been called as a typical European "rational restlessness", which according to Mann (1986, p. 398 ) "was the psychological makeup of Europe". Restlessness had already been pointed out as a singular European characteristic: their incapacity of settling down was unique, and could not be found at any other civilization (MANN, 1986, p. 12) . But also, this restlessness was rational, and here lies another fundamental contribution from Weber's studies. According to this view, Christianity encouraged moral and social improvement against the secular authority, which, although being used sometimes to undercover repression, allowed the emergence of strong streams of social unrest (MANN, 1986, p. 13) . Christian nonconformity and dissatisfaction bias is contrasted to Eastern religions which generally accepted the social order, either rationally (Confucianism), irrationally (Taoism) or mystically (Hinduism) ( MANN, 1986, p. 13) .
Some conclusions from the comparison with the historical literature
So far, we have briefly seen some of the elements most utilized by historical literature to explain the rise of the West and thus characterize what it is to be Western.
We shall now use these as a benchmark for the evaluation of the BRICS and the IBSA, to try to answer our self imposed question of whether these are anti-Western. Very probably, the two most controversial elements from this list are capitalism and democracy.
Beginning with capitalism, there is a clear challenge presented by China, which remains notionally a communist country. Even though since Deng Xiaoping's reforms the country has adopted capitalist structures, especially through the creation of the special economic zones (RODRIK 2011, p. 152-3) , many fear that it represents a threat to capitalism. Nevertheless, an interesting explanation comes from the "varieties of capitalism" literature, which emphasizes "institutional and organizational diversity of contemporary economic forms" (BEESON, 2013, p. 278) . This branch of studies highlights how national differences in economic institutional arrangements are a reflex of each country's own history and development path (BEESON, 2013, p. 279 ). This perspective is of special interest for our present enquiry.
Western fears about East Asia are not a new phenomenon, as we have seen in relation to the idea of oriental despotism. Moreover, in the 19 th century, Europeans felt their preeminence and civilization was threatened by the "yellow peril to the Occident"; nowadays, East Asia is a threat for its economic models "that, by not accepting the existing rules of the game, either disadvantage the West, or threaten the dominance of the liberal economic order; or more often, both" (BRESLIN, 2011, p. 111).
Last decades' extraordinary economic growth of China has brought its peculiar economic model to international attention. Joshua Cooper Ramo labeled it the "Beijing Consensus" and affirms that:
It replaces the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, an economic theory made famous in the 1990's for its prescriptive, Washington-knows-best approach to telling other nations how to run themselves.
[…] It does not believe in uniform solutions for every situation. It is defined by a ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment, by a lively defense of national borders and interests, and by the increasingly thoughtful accumulation of tools of asymmetric power projection. It is pragmatic and ideological at the same time (RAMO, 2004, p. 04 ).
The Chinese model of capitalism has differentiated itself from the American one mainly for giving a much larger role for the state to intervene in the economy, and have thus been called "state capitalism". However, although it does not follow the neoliberal principles advocated by the Washington Consensus, it has managed to achieve impressive results, diminishing domestic poverty (even though it still remains extremely high) and growing extraordinarily its industrial basis, exports and GDP. China was able to elicit inordinate amounts of private investment under a system of state ownership (township and village enterprises), something that Russia failed to do under Western-style private ownership. Presumably this was because investors felt more secure when they were allied with local governments with residual claims on the stream of profits than when they had to entrust their assets to private contracts that would have to be enforced by incompetent and corrupt courts. Whatever the underlying reason, China's experience demonstrates how common goals (protection of property rights) can sometimes be achieved under divergent rules (RODRIK, 2006, p. 11-12) .
According to Rodrik's view, the Chinese model, which is more distinct from the American than the Russian one is, has been capable of achieving economic success, even in protecting property rights. It seems, therefore, that the varieties of capitalism existing in the BRICS countries are not exactly anti-Western by judging from the historical perspective. What it presents is a different institutional organization as a result of each country's own historical process. In other words, it is not anti-capitalist, but actually it is not liberal, especially divergent from the current neoliberal model. However, in 2011, when Europe was facing a tough financial situation, the thenChinese premier, Wen Jiabao, imposed some conditions to a possible aid from China, among which it was recognizing his country as a market economy (ANDERLINE, ZHANG, 2011). It seems, therefore, that the main difference is not about being capitalist, but about rejecting the neoliberal guidelines. According to Beeson (2013, p. 286-287) , "China could also provide an alternative, non-neoliberal vision of how the world could be organized". However, he also points out that "the Beijing consensus is about maintaining political control and authority whilst simultaneously allowing a pragmatic, but still limited, expansion of the role of the private sector", since the capitalist class has failed to "push for political liberalization" (BEESON, 2013, p. 286-287 ).
This brings us to the democracy issue, another challenging one in the process of the emergence of countries from the Global South. First of all, if we use for our analysis the Polity IV index, referring to the year of 2012, China is considered an autocracy,
Russia, an open anocracy, and Brazil, India and South Africa, democracies (POLITY IV, 2012). Here, once again, China poses an apparent challenge to Western order, since we have seen through our literature review that historians present democracy as one of the most important elements to the constituency of the West. The fact that the second largest economy, which is gaining greater political influence in consequence of it, is an autocracy is extremely troubling to those who defend liberal democracy. Also, there is the Russian situation, where elections are regularly held since the end of the USSR, but are constantly charged of not being free but, instead, manipulated by the current political rulers (BARRY, SCHWIRTZ, 2012).
Still in this discussion, but from another point of view, Zaki Laïdi argues that "the BRICS -even the democratic ones -fundamentally diverge from the liberal vision of
Western countries" (LAÏDI, 2011, p.02). Furthermore, for him, the BRICS "share a common fundamental political objective: to erode Western hegemonic claims by protecting the principle which these claims are deemed to most threaten, namely the political sovereignty of states" (LAÏDI, 2011, p.01). His conclusion is that the BRICS identify themselves as a group because they "share a sovereignist approach to avoid sharing sovereignty" (LAÏDI, 2011 p. 12). This claim, however, seems to go on the opposite direction of what has been concluded from the literature review. Historians defend that the political fragmentation of Middle Ages Europe developed a competitive civilization and that if a ruler had had total control, as happened in Asia, this might not have been the case. What Laïdi claims, on the other hand, is that the BRICS wish to defend their sovereignty against the hegemonic Western, and that this would therefore be anti-Western -something opposite from the review of the historic literature.
Another element of the Eurocentric historical discourse about the rise of the West is "inventiveness". In this section, it is useful to look at the current intellectual property patents records. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has released its latest report in 2013, with data collected in 2012. In this report, we can see that the country that "has accounted for the largest numbers of applications filed throughout the world for the four types of IP (patents, utility models, trademarks and industrial designs)" was China, accounting for 27.8% of all global patent fillings (WIPO, 2013, p. After having seen an overview of the emergence of countries from the Global South, a brief literature review of Eurocentric historians explaining the "rise of the West" and comparing it to the BRICS and IBSA countries nowadays, we can now try to answer our self imposed research question, assuming that to be anti-Western these countries should have policies and institutions in opposition to the Western ones.
Beginning with capitalism, we have seen that the greatest difference relates to neoliberal policies from the Washington Consensus. Nevertheless, some left-wing analysts, like the Marxist Vijay Prashad, do not even agree with this. For him, "the BRICS group has not endorsed an ideological alternative to neoliberalism. What it has advanced is a set of proposals that are gentler than Northern neoliberalism, with a modest challenge to US hegemony" (PRASHAD, 2012, p. 223 ). Also, one should wonder: how can a grouping, originally designed by one of the biggest investment banks in the world as an attractive source for financial investments, be anti-capitalist?
Secondly, there is democracy. On the one hand, it is true that China is an autocracy, and Russia's democratic legitimacy is often contested. On the other hand, one of the main goals of the BRICS and the IBSA is to reform the global governance architecture, specially making it more democratic.
Third, certainly it is not possible to say these are anti-Western groupings in what refers to inventiveness. Not only these countries value scientific discoveries and progress, as they are having a large contribution in the filling of new patents. And, finally, the cultural/rational element is also not valid here, for it would not be acceptable either to say that these are irrational countries or that because they not all of them are
Christian they are anti-Western.
To 
Emerging powers actions within existent international organizations
According to Kupchan (2012, p. 65) However, a closer look at the behavior of the emerging countries within these organizations reveals that although their discourse is somehow unified, they still lack unity in action. Rios and Veiga (2013) On the multilateral trade system, for example, the main relation between BRICS countries agendas is one of disagreement. Roughly, Brazil and South Africa have a proliberalization posture in relation to agricultural goods, while China and India share a more defensive approach, trying to protect their fragile agricultural sectors (RIOS; VEIGA, 2013, p. 11-12) . On the other hand, when discussing non-agricultural market access (NAMA) Brazil is the most defensive of all of the five, while China discretely aims to boost its manufactured goods exports (RIOS, VEIGA, 2013, p. 11-12) . These individual differences create many disagreements between countries that were all supposedly united against the Western dominance of international institutions.
Creating new international forums
Although there may be some challenges to the coordinate action among the emerging countries within existing international forums, their capacity of affecting the multilateral system is increased by their possibility of establishing new groupings.
According to Hampson and Heinbecker (2011, p. 307 ):
New informal partnerships [...] and international institutional innovations seem likely to emerge among countries that are not themselves 'great powers' by the traditional definition, but that nonetheless have both compelling strategic interests in a peaceful, prosperous world and the diplomatic and, sometimes, military capacity and political disposition to make a significant difference. Global governance and regional arrangements seem unlikely to be left exclusively to the permanent members of the Security Council.
Globalization has catalyzed the power shift taking place in the international system, but it was not the only factor that caused it. The United States, after the end of the Cold War, deliberately pursued a policy of "hub and spoke", selecting countries from around the world which pleased them and keeping relations with them in the condition of "regional leaders" (ALDEN; VIEIRA, 2005 VIEIRA, , p. 1082 . This deliberate activist policy ended up legitimating some countries as regional powers within their geographic domains -especially India, Brazil and South Africa. There is a large literature which labels these countries as middle powers, but one of a new type. The Brasilia Declaration presents the group's understanding of the world order and their aims. They present themselves as "three countries with vibrant democracies, from three regions of the developing world, active on a global scale, with the aim of examining themes on the international agenda and those of mutual interest" (IBSA, 2003) . It is noteworthy that they propose, for multiple times, social policies and defend humanitarian aspects of international cooperation. The group reminds of global inequalities, recalling that they are aggravated by the deepening of globalization, and the need to fight these. The three IBSA-governments propose to put priority on the promotion of social equity and inclusion, by implementing effective policies to fight hunger and poverty, to support family run farms, and to promote food security, health, social assistance, employment, education, human rights and environmental protection (IBSA, 2003 The outcomes of these working groups are thus mixed, and it would be hard to draw a unified conclusion about the emerging countries impact on global governance through them. We should therefore look closer to another initiative of the IBSA grouping, i.e., the IBSA Fund. The IBSA Fund supports projects on a demand-driven basis through partnerships with local governments, national institutions and implementing partners. Initiatives are concrete expressions of solidarity and objectives range from promoting food security, to addressing HIV/AIDS, to extending access to safe drinking water -all with the aim of contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Important concerns of IBSA partners in the design and implementation of the Fund's projects include capacity building among project beneficiaries, built-in project sustainability, and knowledge-sharing among Southern experts and institutions (IBSA, 2014, p. 02) Every year, each one of the three countries contribute with one million dollars to Also, the Fund is important for the analysis of the impact of new international forums created by emerging countries. On the one hand, it shows how plurilateral, or "minilateral", groupings, despite being composed by a limited number of countries, might engage with third parties. Hampson and Heibecker (2011, p. 306 ) acknowledge the increased capacity of decision making and agility of these new plurilateral groups, but stress that they lack the universal representation of established organizations such as the UN, which excludes most countries, and especially the least developed ones.
Furthermore, the beneficiary countries are not simply passive aid receivers, since IBSA Fund projects are executed through partnerships with national governments and local institutions (IBSA, 2014) . This is even more important for it composes the emerging countries action as donor states, which challenges traditional international assistance rationale, in which aid flows from North to South and incorporates a binary vision which differentiates donors and receptors:
Structural dichotomies and binary oppositions have always determined development thinking since its beginning in 17th century Europe and still do in today's international development discourse. The foundation of the development paradigm is therefore difference in a twofold sense. The development paradigm universalistically denies difference at one level and essentialises the same difference at another.
[…] These binaries are not merely descriptive but highly normative in the sense that they legitimize a distinct political and economic order. In their normative character these discursive categories not only intend to consolidate the status quo but also silence critique in the name of humanitarianism and benevolent development 'assistance'. This normative character is translated into various dimensions such as a geographical dimension, where the normative is formulated as a spatial logic (the West or North and the non-West or the South), or a historical dimension where the superior is the one ahead in a chronological or evolutionary order (SIX, 2009 (SIX, , p. 1005 (SIX, -1107 
Conclusions
The facts studied above are certainly far from sufficient to draw lasting conclusions about the real impact and nature of the recent actions and institutions established by emerging powers from the Global South. Nevertheless, it is possible to point some observable features and tendencies.
The most important of the conclusions is that it seems a bit extreme to label these new initiatives as anti-Western. The BRICS and IBSA countries do not propose policies which go in the opposite direction than those held by the established powers. What our brief review of the recent historical facts demonstrates is, actually, an inability of pursuing actions autonomously within the existing forums. Even in these institutions, there are important disagreements among the emerging countries, which weaken their capacity of advocating for structural change and thus any chance of making these institutions pursue anti-Western goals. Not even seems true the accusation of an anti-multilateralism approach, since we have not witnessed any action destined to purposefully undermine the multilateral system and organizations.
What we do have witnessed, indeed, is a plurilateral engagement in these new forums, and here we may draw another lesson. Although these countries have been profiting with these informal, flexible and variable coordination mechanisms, it was the more institutionalized initiatives which have propitiated the most concrete outcomes, as
we can see in the IBSA case where the evaluation of the working groups is one of mixed results while the IBSA Fund is considered a success.
Finally, from the elements considered in this paper, the IBSA Fund is precisely the one which seems most capable of delivering innovative and transformative results, to developing and least developed countries but also to the whole global governance architecture. Not only it is promoting necessary projects in the neediest regions of the world, but it is also changing the fundamental paradigm of international assistance and humanitarian aid. It simultaneously changes the position of these new donors -who have historically been aid receivers and colonized countries -and helps the least developed countries. Also, it has an extremely important outcome in challenging these North-South, East-West dichotomies, which, as Six (2009) 
